Mr. Bill Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500
Fax: (202) 456-2883 (4 pages)
Mr. William S. Cohen
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C.
Fax: (703) 697-8299 (4 pages)
Senators and Representatives
U. S. Congress
Washington, D.C.
Dear President Clinton, Secretary Cohen, and Members of Congress:
We are writing out of profound concern that the continued
stationing of the United States 3rd Marine Division in Okinawa poses
serious risks to the interests and security of our nation. Our conclusion
is the result of an intensive study of military, political, and economic
issues, and an ongoing survey of public opinion in Japan and the United
States. We have concluded that (1) this Marine division is not needed in
Okinawa to maintain national security, to defend Japan, or to foster
stability in the region; and (2) its continued deployment in Okinawa has
negative effects on Japan's governing coalition-pro-American and supportive
of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty-which endanger the Security Treaty and
our overall relations with that country.
The recent series of ugly incidents involving Marines in Okinawa,
including the 1995 rape of a twelve-year-old girl, the accidental dumping
of a 1,000 pound bomb off the main port, and the mistaken firing of 1,520
uranium-cased shells in nearby waters, represent only the tip of an iceberg
that threatens to chill our relations with a vital ally. Resentment in
Japan is fueled by other crimes involving Marines in Okinawa, frequent
vehicle and helicopter accidents, traffic tie-ups caused by convoys,
constant noise from Marine aircraft that disturbs local residents and
interrupts classes in public schools, live-fire artillery drills that cause
fires on the outskirts of villages as well as other environmental damage,
and the continued occupation of vast areas of land in this small island
prefecture by 3rd Marine Division bases and exercise areas.
Below is a summary of responses, based on our research, to the
three most commonly stated reasons for the continued deployment of the 3rd
Marine Division in Okinawa:
(1.) This lightly equipped and largely untransportable division cannot
possibly function in a crisis as the "quick-reaction force" it is often
advertised to be.
The United States Navy does not have in-theater sealift capacity to
move this division from Okinawa to "forward areas" such as South Korea or
the Middle East. During an emergency in Korea or the Middle East, most of
the Marines in Okinawa today would be left stranded there as troops in
exile. A realistic compromise would be to retain the 31st MEU (Marine
Expeditionary Unit) of approximately 2,000 personnel in Okinawa and move
the other Marine units to Hawaii or Guam.
(2.) With strong and healthy allies in East Asia, the 3rd Marine Division is
not needed and does not function to deter potential adversaries from
military adventures.
Since Russia and China have opened diplomatic relations with South
Korea, North Korea has become virtually isolated and is on the verge of
economic collapse. South Korea's GNP is almost twenty times larger than
the North's and its population is twice as large.
Contrary to widespread perceptions in the United States, Chinese
conventional military power is declining. The numbers of China's combat
aircraft, submarines, surface ships, and army personnel have all decreased
in recent years, and the obsolescence of its equipment is obvious. Some
modernization of forces has been attempted, but the pace has been slower
than that of Taiwan, South Korea, or Japan. For example, since the early
1990s China has imported only 48 Su-27 fighter aircraft from Russia, but it
must soon retire some 4,500 old fighters, mostly MiG17s, MiG19s, and
MiG21s. The two "Kilo class" submarines China purchased from Russia cannot
possibly replace 60 obsolete submarines in their fleet. Increasing fiscal
deficits and lack of central authority in China, even over local military
commanders, are continuing obstacles to this modernization program.
(3.) The financial support provided by the Japanese government for
maintaining the 3rd Marine Division in Okinawa is increasingly resented by
Japanese taxpayers, especially in Okinawa, and does not justify its
continued deployment there.
Public opinion surveys indicate that about two-thirds of the Japanese
people want to maintain the U.S-Japan Security Treaty, but approximately
the same proportion want the U.S. military presence reduced. A poll
conducted by the newspaper Asahi Shimbun and published on May 15, 1996,
indicated 70% favoring the alliance and 69% wanting U.S. bases reduced.
The Governor of Hawaii and the Congressman from Guam have both
expressed their desire to host the Marines in their localities. One
regiment of the 3rd Marine Division is already stationed in Hawaii, though
the divisional headquarters is in Okinawa. Moving the headquarters, the
one infantry regiment, and one artillery battalion from Okinawa to Hawaii
would improve the overall command and control structure of the 3rd Marine
Division. The Governor of Okinawa has offered to help finance any
redeployment to Hawaii or Guam.
Lacking a rationale for its continued deployment, the problems
associated with the 3rd Marine Division in Okinawa put the U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty at risk, threatening the maintenance of truly vital
military facilities in Japan, such as the ports for American Naval vessels
at Yokosuka and Sasebo. The situation is particularly urgent now as
resentment of the continuing presence of Marines in Okinawa is complicating
the Japanese government's efforts to extend the law which permits U.S.
bases on Japanese soil. Some 3,000 leases concluded under the current law
expire May 14 on land which includes military runways at Kadena Air Force
Base, the largest and busiest U.S. air base in Asia, and portions of eleven
other U.S. installations in Okinawa. With landowners refusing voluntarily
to renew their leases in protest, a political crisis is looming that
threatens maintenance of U.S. bases, and could bring a coalition to power
in Tokyo less favorably disposed to the Security Treaty and less friendly
to U.S. interests generally. Current leaders of both the ruling and
opposition parties have indicated that a U.S. commitment to withdraw
Marines from Okinawa would make it possible for them to support an
extension of the lease law needed to maintain the U.S.-Japan Security
Treaty.
We strongly urge you to support redeployment of the 3rd Marine
Division from Okinawa.
Respectfully,
Chalmers Johnson
for himself and the undersigned
This letter is joined in by:
Dr. K. Amemiya, Del Mar, California
Japan Policy Research Institute
Dr. Hans Baerwald, Blue Oaks Ranch, California
Professor Emeritus, Japanese Politics, UCLA
Dr. Herbert P. Bix, Boston Massachusetts
Lecturer, Japanese History, Harvard University
Dr. Bruce Cumings, Evanston, Illinois
Director, Center for International and Comparative Studies, Northwestern
University
Dr. Norma Field, Chicago, Illinois
Professor of East Asian Languages & Civilizations, University of Chicago
Dr. Andrew Gordon, Cambridge, Massachusetts
Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, Harvard University
Dr. Terry MacDougall, Kyoto, Japan
Stanford University
Dr. Margaret McKeon, Durham, North Carolina
Professor of Political Science, Duke University
Dr. Michael Mochizuki, Washington D.C.
Brookings Institution
Dr. Michael Molasky, New London, Connecticut
Professor of Japanese, Connecticut College
Mr. Richard W. Ormsby, Chicago, Illinois
President, Ormsby International, Veteran, 3rd Marine Division (Okinawa)
Dr. Steve Rabson, Providence, Rhode Island
Professor of Japanese, Brown University
Mr. Patrick Smith, Norfolk, Connecticut
Author of Japan: A Reinterpretation (1997)
Dr. Koji Taira, Urbana-Champaign, Illinois
Professor of Economics, University of Illinois
Dr. Meredith Woo-Cumings, Evanston, Illinois
Professor of Political Science, Northwestern University
Chalmers Johnson
President, Japan Policy Research Institute
E-mail: cjohnson@ucsd.edu
Fax: (619) 944-9022